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INTRODUCTION
As technology grows, privacy shrinks, but it does not have to.
With the advent of small, affordable cameras, drones, and other such
surveillance equipment, police departments have new, easy ways to
monitor suspects without those suspects’ knowledge. 1 These
 J.D. candidate, May 2022, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of
Technology; B.A. in International Relations, Concentration in Regional Politics and
Cultural Anthropology in the Middle East and Africa, Boston University, May 2015.
1 See, e.g., Ali Watkins, How the NYPD is Using Post-9/11 Tools on Everyday
New Yorkers, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 8, 2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/09/08/nyregion/nypd-9-11-police-surveillance.html
(describing the application of antiterrorism technology to combat street crime);
Monica Davey, Chicago Police Try to Predict Who May Shoot or Be Shot, N.Y.
TIMES (May 23, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/24/us/armed-with-datachicago-police-try-to-predict-who-may-shoot-or-beshot.html?&moduleDetail=section-news3&action=click&contentCollection=U.S.&region=Footer&module=MoreInSection&
version=WhatsNext&contentID=WhatsNext&pgty (describing an algorithm that
predicts who will be involved in violent crimes); Craig Tim-berg, New Surveillance
Technology Can Track Everyone in an Area for Several Hours at a Time, WASH.
POST (Feb. 5, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/technology/newsurveillance-technology-can-track-everyone-in-an-area-for-several-hours-at-a-
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technological advancements raise important questions about the
Fourth Amendment’s protections “against unreasonable searches.” 2
The Seventh Circuit addressed one such question in United States v.
Tuggle.3 Following a line of Fourth Amendment challenges to lengthy
surveillance without a warrant, 4 the Seventh Circuit held that nonstop
surveillance by cameras attached to utility poles for eighteen months
outside Tuggle’s home—without a warrant—was not a violation of his
rights.5 The Seventh Circuit’s analysis was shortsighted and flies in the
face of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. Not only is this decision
contrary to the Supreme Court’s Katz Test,6 but it also opens the door
for law enforcement to engage in broader technologically assisted
surveillance in the absence of a warrant.
The issue presented here is whether the prolonged use of pole
cameras in Tuggle comports with Fourth Amendment search
jurisprudence; specifically, whether the Seventh Circuit’s decision
complies with a reasonable expectation of privacy that modern society
is willing to accept. Because technology grows every day, the average
person’s expectations of privacy will naturally change.7 Justice Scalia
presciently summed up the issue when he wrote, “The question we
confront . . . is what limits there are upon this power of technology to
shrink the realm of guaranteed privacy.”8 Prior to Justice Scalia’s
time/2014/02/05/82fl556e-876f-11e3-a5bd-844629433ba3_story.html (describing
the use of aerial cameras to surveil streets).
2 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
3 4 F.4th 505 (7th Cir. 2021).
4 E.g., Carpenter v. United States, 585 U.S. __, 138 S.Ct. 2206 (2018) (127
days of cell-site location data collected); United States v. Bucci, 582 F.3d 108 (1st
Cir. 2009) (eight-month long video surveillance); United States v. Kay, No. 17-CR16, 2018 WL 3995902 (E.D. Wis. Aug. 21, 2018) (eighty-seven days of pole camera
surveillance); United States v. Mazzara, No. 16 CR 576, 2017 WL 4862793
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 27, 2017) (twenty-one-month video surveillance).
5 Tuggle, 4 F.4th at 528–29.
6 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). The
Supreme Court clarified the two-prong test in California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207,
211 (1986).
7 United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 429 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring).
8 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001).
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description, Justice Brandeis wrote in dissent, “[d]iscovery and
invention have made it possible for the government, by means far
more effective than stretching upon the rack, to obtain disclosure in
court of what is whispered in the closet.”9 Courts should be aware of
changing expectations of privacy and adapt to them rather than strictly
adhering to past cases involving old or different technology as the
Seventh Circuit did here.
As Judge Flaum wrote in the unanimous opinion in Tuggle, “the
Katz test as currently interpreted may eventually afford the
government ever-wider latitude over the most sophisticated, intrusive,
and all-knowing technologies with lessening constitutional
constraints.”10 Instead of turning away from an interpretation that
decreases protection from these “intrusive” and “all-knowing
technologies,” Judge Flaum chose to embrace outdated norms of what
society accepts as private.
This note consists of three parts. First, it will provide a brief
background of the Fourth Amendment from its inception at the
Founding through the Supreme Court analysis used today. Second, this
note will provide the facts of United States v. Tuggle. Third, it will
analyze the Seventh Circuit’s opinion arguing that the opinion does not
comply with the Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment search analysis,
sets a problematic precedent, and fails to consider the practical impact
of allowing prolonged warrantless surveillance.
A. History and Precedent
This section will provide a brief history of the creation of the
Fourth Amendment and the Supreme Court’s past interpretations of it.
It will first discuss the impetus behind creating the Amendment. Next,
it will provide a brief overview of how the Court interpreted the
Fourth Amendment prior to a shift in Katz v. United States. It will then
9

Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 473 (1928) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting), overruled in part by Berger v. State of N.Y., 388 U.S. 41 (1967), and
overruled in part by Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
10 4 F.4th at 510 (7th Cir. 2021).
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outline the Katz test and finally how the Katz Test has been applied in
recent cases with more advanced surveillance technology used by law
enforcement.
1. The Origin of the Fourth Amendment
As is well-known, the Founders drafted the Fourth Amendment to
protect themselves against British search and seizure practices. 11 Early
Americans balked at British officials’ use of writs of assistance which
gave the officials latitude to search homes, stores, warehouses, and
other places for contraband. 12 Specifically, from 1761 to 1791, British
search and seizure practices were so aggressive that John Adams
included language in the Fourth Amendment barring these practices.13
Those same principles have informed Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence for decades,14 and should continue to do so.
In his dissent in Olmstead v. United States, Justice Brandeis aptly
articulated why protections afforded by the Fourth Amendment are
and should remain sacrosanct:
The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure
conditions favorable to the pursuit of happiness. They
recognized the significance of man’s spiritual nature, of his
feelings and of his intellect. They knew that only a part of the
pain, pleasure and satisfactions of life are to be found in
material things. They sought to protect Americans in their
beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and their sensations.
They conferred, as against the government, the right to be let
alone-the most comprehensive of rights and the right most
11

Tiffany M. Russo, Esq., Searches and Seizures as Applied to Changing
Digital Technologies: A Look at Pole Camera Surveillance, 12 SETON HALL CIR.
REV. 114, 118 (2015).
12 The Honorable M. Blane Michael, Reading the Fourth Amendment:
Guidance from the Mischief that Gave it Birth, 85 N.Y.U. L.REV. 905, 907 (2010).
13 Thomas K. Clancy, The Framers’ Intent: John Adams, His Era, and the
Fourth Amendment, 86 IND. L.J. 979, 980 (2011).
14 See Michael, supra note 12 at 912–14.
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valued by civilized men. To protect, that right, every
unjustifiable intrusion by the government upon the privacy of
the individual, whatever the means employed, must be
deemed a violation of the Fourth Amendment. 15
While the interests of society to employ law enforcement for its
protection are certainly important, “[t]he greatest dangers to liberty
lurk in insidious encroachment by men of zeal, well-meaning but
without understanding.”16
2. Traditional Fourth Amendment Search Analysis – Trespass
The seminal case that guided Fourth Amendment search analysis
prior to Katz was Olmstead v. United States.17 The question presented
to the Supreme Court in Olmstead was “whether the use of evidence of
private telephone conversations between the defendants and others,
intercepted by means of wire tapping, amounted to a violation of the
Fourth . . .Amendment[].”18 The defendants were convicted in district
court of a conspiracy to violate the National Prohibition Act. 19 Four
federal prohibition officers discovered and collected evidence in their
investigation by intercepting telephone messages between the
conspirators.20 To tap the phone lines, officers inserted small wires
along telephone wires from the homes of some of the defendants and
the telephone wires leading from Olmstead’s chief office from where

15

Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting), overruled in part by Berger v. State of N.Y., 388 U.S. 41 (1967), and
overruled in part by Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
16 Id. at 479.
17 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967).
18 Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 455. The case also analyzed whether the Fifth
Amendment was violated by the wire-tapping activity, but the Court stated that the
Fifth Amendment could not be applied unless the Fourth Amendment was violated.
Id. at 462.
19 Id. at 455.
20 Id. at 456.

147

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 17

Fall 2021

he managed the conspiracy. 21 Officers inserted the wires without
trespassing upon any property of the conspirators.22 Evidence gathered
over months included large business transactions, orders given for
liquor by customers, difficulties the defendants faced, and bribes
promised to officers by Olmstead—the chief conspirator—to secure
the release of Olmstead’s co-conspirators.23
The Supreme Court held that the “language of the amendment
cannot be extended and expanded to include telephone wires, reaching
to the whole world from the defendant’s house or office. The
intervening wires are not part of his house or office.” 24 To support its
holding, the Court emphasized the language of the Fourth
Amendment25 itself which specifies “the right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects.”26 Because the
wiretapping at issue in Olmstead did not constitute a search of the
defendants’ person, papers, or “tangible material effects or an actual
physical invasion of his house,” there was no Fourth Amendment
violation.27 The Supreme Court has since departed from this
interpretation of the Fourth Amendment to hold that “the reach of that
Amendment cannot turn upon the presence or absence of a physical
instruction into any given enclosure,” 28 which brings us to the
modern-day analysis.
3. Modern-Day Fourth Amendment Search Analysis: The Katz Test
The current standard applied when a search is challenged under
the Fourth Amendment is whether an individual has a

21

Id. at 456–57.
Id. at 457.
23 Id.
24
Id. at 465.
25 Id. at 464.
26 U.S. CONST. amend. IV (emphasis added).
27 Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 466.
28 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967).
22

148

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 17

Fall 2021

“‘constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of privacy.’” 29 In
his concurring opinion in Katz v. United States, Justice Harlan
proposed a two-part guideline which the Supreme Court has since
followed: “first that a person ha[s] exhibited an actual (subjective)
expectation of privacy, and second, that the expectation [is] one that
society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”30 This guideline is
now referred to as the Katz Test.31
In Katz, the prosecution was permitted, over the defendant’s
objection, to introduce evidence that Federal Bureau of Investigation
(“FBI”) agents collected, without a warrant, from an electronic
listening and recording device attached to the outside of a public
telephone booth.32 The Supreme Court overturned the lower court,
holding that law enforcement should have obtained a warrant prior to
conducting this form of surveillance. 33 Specifically, the majority stated
that what an individual “seeks to preserve as private, even in an area
accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected.”34 Further,
when someone enters a telephone booth, closes the door behind him or
her, and pays for the call, that person “is surely entitled to assume that
the words he [or she] utters into the mouthpiece will not be broadcast
to the world. To read the Constitution more narrowly is to ignore the
vital role that the public telephone has come to play in private
communication.”35 It was not relevant to the analysis whether a law
enforcement officer could stand outside the phone booth to listen or
that the person using the phone booth could be seen from the outside
because “the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places.”36

29

California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 211 (1986) (quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at
360 (Harlan, J., concurring)).
30 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
31 See id.
32
Id. at 348.
33 Id. at 359.
34 Id. at 351 (emphasis added).
35 Id. at 352.
36 Id. at 351.
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4. Katz Progeny Responds to Technological Advances
More recent cases have considered technologically advanced
methods of surveillance employed by law enforcement. The Supreme
Court used the Katz Test in United States v. Knotts.37 There, the Court
held that placing a beeper in a five-gallon drum of chloroform to
monitor a car carrying the drum from its place of purchase to a
secluded cabin did not violate the defendant’s Fourth Amendment
rights.38 Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, applied the first
prong of the Katz:
A person travelling in an automobile on public thoroughfares
has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements
from one place to another. When [Knotts’s codefendant]
travelled over the public streets he voluntarily conveyed to
anyone who wanted to look the fact that he was travelling
over particular roads in a particular direction, the fact of
whatever stops he made, and the fact of his final destination
when he exited from public roads onto private property.39
Rehnquist reasoned that the use of the beeper to track these
movements did not alter the fact that the surveillance could have been
done visually from public places along the route. 40 Notably, the Court
attempted to assuage any fears of a growing surveillance state by
emphasizing the limited use of the beeper’s transmissions in that
case.41 The majority stated that nothing in the record demonstrated that
the beeper was used after it indicated that the chloroform drum had
reached its destination.42 Police merely used the beeper to track the
drum from where Knotts picked it up to transport it to his property and
37

460 U.S. 276, 280–81 (1983).
Id. at 285.
39 Id. at 281–82.
40 Id. at 282.
41 Id. at 284–85.
42 Id.
38
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then used that data to secure a search warrant. 43 Law enforcement did
not use the beeper signal to track movement of the chloroform once it
reached the defendant’s property. 44
Just three years later, the Supreme Court decided California v.
Ciraolo.45 There, the Court was asked to “determine whether the
Fourth Amendment is violated by aerial observation without a warrant
from an altitude of 1,000 feet of a fenced-in backyard within the
curtilage of a home.”46 Curtilage is defined in common law as the area
immediately outside one’s home where activity is considered related to
the “sanctity of [one’s] home and the privacies of life.”47 Law
enforcement could not observe what was in the backyard from streetlevel because of a six-foot tall outer fence and ten-foot tall inner fence
around it.48 In response to an anonymous tip, police officers secured a
private plane to fly over the defendant’s house. 49 From overhead, the
officers in the plane were able to identify marijuana plants in the
defendant’s yard.50
In its decision, the Court applied the Katz Test.51 It found that the
first prong was satisfied. Ciraolo had “met the test of manifesting his
own subjective intent and desire to maintain privacy” by erecting a
fence around his backyard.52 When it turned to the second prong of
Katz, the Court reasoned that the police’s observations occurred within
publicly navigable airspace in a physically nonintrusive manner. 53 The
Court further wrote, “[a]ny member of the public flying in this
airspace who glanced down could have seen everything that these
43

Id.
Id. at 285.
45 476 U.S. 207 (1986).
46 Id. at 209.
47 Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886).
48 Id.
49
California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 209 (1986).
50 Id.
51 Id. at 211.
52 Id.
53 Id. at 213.
44
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officers observed.”54 Because private and commercial flight had
become a matter of routine, it was not reasonable for the defendant to
expect privacy from being observed by a passing plane.55 The Court
did make it clear that the observation at issue here was only “visible to
the naked eye” and a “simple visual observation[] from a public place”
rather than a more advanced technology. 56
The Supreme Court again evaluated the Fourth Amendment
implications of more advanced technology in Kyllo v. United States.57
In that case, the Court decided whether thermal-imaging technology
aimed at a private home from a public street constituted a search under
the Fourth Amendment.58 The Court held that such actions constituted
a search because “obtaining by sense-enhancing technology any
information regarding the interior of the home that could not otherwise
have been obtained” without a trespass into the home constitutes a
search.59 Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, pushed back against
the State’s argument that law enforcement only detected heat that
radiated from the exterior of the home. 60 Scalia rejected “such a
mechanical interpretation of the Fourth Amendment” because
changing the approach employed in Katz—where the surveillance only
picked up sound waves from outside a telephone booth—“would leave
the homeowner at the mercy of advancing technology.”61 He further
reasoned that the rule the Court adopted in this case must take into
account advanced technology that has yet to be developed.62
Reviewing another use of new technology, in United States v.
Jones, the Court held that law enforcement’s use of a GlobalPositioning-System (“GPS”) attached to an individual’s vehicle to
54

Id. at 213–14.
Id. at 215.
56 Id. at 214–15.
57 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
58
Id. at 29.
59 Id. at 34.
60 Id. at 35.
61 Id.
62 Id. at 36.
55
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monitor the vehicle’s movements on public streets constituted a search
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. 63 The government used
the device for twenty-eight days.64 The Court reasoned that the
government “trespassorily inserted the information-gathering device”
to conclude an improper search was conducted. 65 Justice Alito’s
concurring opinion is more informative because it relied on the Katz
analysis rather than the outdated trespass theory of Fourth Amendment
interpretation.66
Under the modern-day approach, Alito wrote that “relatively
short-term monitoring of a person’s movements on public streets
accords with expectations of privacy that our society has recognized as
reasonable.”67 Further emphasizing the length of the warrantless
surveillance at issue, he went on to assert that prolonged GPS
monitoring when investigating most criminal activity would intrude
upon society’s privacy expectations. 68 Alito concluded that “the
lengthy monitoring that occurred in this case constituted a search.” 69
The Supreme Court again articulated the problem of prolonged
surveillance without a warrant in Carpenter v. United States.70 There,
the Court held that the 127-day collection of defendant’s cell-site
location information was a Fourth Amendment search.71 The Court
reasoned that “an all-encompassing record of the holder’s
whereabouts,” exposing “an intimate window into a person’s life,
revealing not only his particular movements, but through them” his

63

565 U.S. 400, 404 (2012).
Id. at 403.
65 Id. at 410.
66 Id. at 418–19 (Alito, J., concurring) (explaining that the majority’s analysis
“has little if any support in current Fourth Amendment case law”).
67
Id. at 430 (Alito, J., concurring).
68 Id.
69 Id. at 431(Alito, J., concurring).
70 585 U.S. __, 138 S.Ct. 2206 (2018).
71 Id. at 2211–12.
64
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associations with family, friends, politics, a profession, and a religion
violated the reasonable expectation of privacy. 72
Justice Rehnquist put it best when he wrote—in response to the
Knotts defendant’s concern that the result of the holding would be that
twenty-four-hour warrantless surveillance of anyone would be
possible73—that “if such dragnet type of law enforcement practices as
[Knotts] envisions should eventually occur, there will be time enough
then to determine whether different constitutional principles may be
applicable.”74 Now is that time.
B. Facts of the Case
Between 2013 and 2016, law enforcement investigated a large
methamphetamine distribution conspiracy in central Illinois which led
to Travis Tuggle’s prosecution. 75 The main evidence that the state used
in its case against Tuggle was surveillance footage from cameras
installed on public property on nearby utility poles, called pole
cameras.76 Law enforcement never sought a warrant for the cameras,
and no exception to the warrant requirement applied. 77 The cameras
could view the front of Tuggle’s home, an adjoining parking area, and
a shed owned by Tuggle’s codefendant, Joshua Vaultonburg.78
These cameras recorded activity at Tuggle’s home for nearly
eighteen months around the clock. 79 Law enforcement could remotely
72

Id. at 2217.
United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 283 (1983).
74 Id. at 284.
75 United States v. Tuggle, 4 F.4th 505, 511 (7th Cir. 2021).
76 Id. at 511–12.
77 Id. at 512. See, e.g., Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14–15 (1948)
(exceptional circumstances exist “in which, on balancing the need for effective law
enforcement against the right of privacy” a search warrant may be “dispensed
with”); Carroll v. United States 267 U.S. 132, 149 (1925) (search and seizure
without a warrant is valid when “made upon probable cause, that is, upon a belief,
reasonably arising out of circumstances known to the seizing officer”).
78 Tuggle, 4 F.4th at 511.
79 Id.
73
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zoom, pan, and tilt the cameras; they could also view the footage in
real-time and review it from the FBI office in Springfield, Illinois. 80
Utilizing cameras in this way gave law enforcement a major
advantage.81 Officers monitored every moment of the activity at
Tuggle’s home completely unnoticed unlike warrantless in-person
surveillance which could have signaled to Tuggle that he was being
watched.82 This advantage was particularly useful because Tuggle’s
neighborhood was lightly traveled and surveillance vehicles on the
street would have been obvious.83
Because of the cameras, law enforcement agents were able to tally
over 100 instances of what presumably was distribution of
methamphetamine from Tuggle’s residence. 84 The footage showed
persons arriving at his home with various items and leaving with
smaller items or nothing.85 Later, other individuals supposedly arrived,
paid for the drugs, and left.86 Officers also reviewed footage of Tuggle
leaving his home to put items in Vaultonburg’s shed. 87
Law enforcement then used the recordings to secure a search
warrant for the inside of Tuggle’s home. 88 As a result, a grand jury
indicted Tuggle on two counts: (1) a violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1)
and (b)(1)(A) for conspiring to distribute, and possession with intent to
distribute, at least fifty grams of methamphetamine and at least 500
grams of a mixture containing methamphetamine, and (2) a violation
of 21 U.S.C. § 856(a)(1) for maintaining a drug-involved premises.89
Prior to trial, Tuggle moved to suppress the pole camera evidence,
arguing its collection violated his Fourth Amendment rights against
80

Id.
See id.
82 Id.
83 Id.
84 Id.
85
Id. at 512.
86 Id.
87 Id.
88 Id.
89 Id.
81
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unlawful search without a warrant. 90 The district court denied the
motion and Tuggle’s two motions to reconsider, explaining that the
camera usage did not constitute a search. 91 The day before trial,
Tuggle entered a conditional guilty plea to both counts in the
indictment but reserved his right to appeal the court’s denial of his
motions to suppress.92 He was sentenced to 360 months’ imprisonment
on count one and 240 months’ imprisonment on count two to be served
concurrently.93 Tuggle timely appealed to the Seventh Circuit. 94
C. Seventh Circuit Holding
The Seventh Circuit held in Tuggle “that the extensive pole
camera surveillance in this case did not constitute a search under the
current understanding of the Fourth Amendment.” 95 The court stated
that Supreme Court precedent and a lack of statutory or jurisprudential
methods to curb law enforcement’s use of the surveillance systems in
Tuggle’s case prohibited it from finding for Tuggle. 96 Further, the
court suggested that “it might soon be time to revisit the Fourth
Amendment test established in Katz” or that Congress should legislate
to protect privacy rights as technology advances. 97
D. How the Seventh Circuit Erred
This part details three principal arguments. First, that the Seventh
Circuit’s opinion in Tuggle does not follow the Katz Test because,
under the second prong, society would consider eighteen months of
continuous surveillance a violation of privacy. Second, by stating that
90

Id.
Id.
92 Id.
93
Id.
94 Id.
95 Id. at 511.
96 Id.
97 Id. at 528.
91
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the Fourth Amendment may not protect individuals once a technology
becomes widespread, the Seventh Circuit set a dangerous precedent.
Third, the court failed to consider the practical impact of the type of
surveillance at issue in Tuggle, especially in the age of COVID-19
lockdowns and remote work.
1. Contrary to Katz
The Seventh Circuit’s holding in the instant case does not comply
with the Katz Test. The court correctly notes that the first, subjective
prong of the test has not been applied or used uniformly, and that some
scholars question its significance in addressing these types of cases. 98
Because the court did not discuss the first prong in this case, neither
will I; the court did not find that the first prong was dispositive for the
Fourth Amendment analysis.99 The second prong of Katz looks at
whether “the expectation [of privacy is] one that society is prepared to
recognize as ‘reasonable.’”100
In evaluating Tuggle’s claim under the second, objective prong of
Katz, the court wrote, “Tuggle knowingly exposed the areas captured
by the three cameras. . . . He therefore did not have an expectation of
privacy that society would be willing to accept as reasonable in what
happened in the front of his home.”101 To support this conclusion, the
Seventh Circuit relied heavily on Supreme Court precedent with facts
far removed from the case at bar. 102 Specifically, it cited Kyllo to
distinguish the use of pole cameras here and Ciraolo to analogize to
the use of pole cameras here. 103
98Id.

at 514.
It should be noted that Tuggle did not erect a fence around his property or
otherwise shield it from public view, a typical sign of a subjective expectation of
privacy, but the Seventh Circuit did not find that fact to be dispositive. Id. at 513.
100
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
101 Tuggle, 4 F.4th at 514.
102 Id. at 514–17.
103 Id. (citing Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001); Ciraolo, 476 U.S.
at 213).
99
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Contrary to the court’s opinion, the prolonged use of pole cameras
here is more akin to the former, where law enforcement used thermal
imaging technology, than the latter, where officers conducted a flyover
at 1,000 feet. Specifically, as Tuggle argued, using pole cameras for
eighteen months nonstop gave law enforcement a view into his life
that could not have been revealed by short-term surveillance.104 While
it is true that the pole cameras used did not allow the government to
see inside Tuggle’s house, nor did the cameras capture Tuggle’s
movements outside the home, the cameras recorded the comings and
goings at his home which revealed a significant amount of
information.105
The Carpenter holding applies to the eighteen-month camera
surveillance of Tuggle. The Supreme Court’s concern in Carpenter
was that the cell-site location data provided law enforcement with “an
all-encompassing record” of the holder’s activity and associations with
family and friends in violation of reasonable expectations of
privacy.106 The cameras at issue in the instant case viewed and
recorded who came and went from Tuggle’s home; law enforcement
could see who his friends and family were, what deliveries were made,
when he came and left, how long visitors stayed, etc. for a year and a
half. That is certainly enough time to uncover “an intimate window”
into and detailed record of Tuggle’s life. By observing Tuggle for this
long absent a warrant, law enforcement went too far, similar to the
officers in the Carpenter case.
It is essential to note that the cameras here did not capture any
activity that was illegal on its face. Rather, the officers counted
occasions of “what they suspected were deliveries of
104

Tuggle, 4 F.4th at 517. This principle is called the mosaic theory which has
been defined in various ways. Essentially, it is the theory that law enforcement “can
learn more from a given sliver of information if it can put that information in the
context of a broader pattern, a mosaic.” Matthew B. Kugler & Lior Jacob
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Mosaic Theory, 2015 SUP. CT. REV. 205, 205 (2015). The Supreme Court has not
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methamphetamine to Tuggle’s residence.” 107 Law enforcement did not
collect footage of actual drugs or money changing hands nor did it
have footage of manufacturing drugs at Tuggle’s home. 108 The pole
cameras captured people coming to Tuggle’s home with items and
later leaving with smaller items. 109 They also recorded others later
entering the home to “purportedly pay for and pick up
methamphetamine.”110 The Seventh Circuit wrote that “the recordings
showed Tuggle carrying items to Vaultonburg’s shed across the street”
which was further evidence of a drug operation. 111 These activities do
not necessarily demonstrate illegal activity, but may show that a
person is running any type business from their home. 112 Without more,
the activity recorded at Tuggle’s home would likely not suggest a
massive illegal drug operation. By concluding that this activity does
evidence illegal behavior, the court takes for granted law
enforcement’s justification for surveilling Tuggle for as long as it did,
but the Fourth Amendment was drafted in order to protect against this
level of surveillance without a warrant.
The Seventh Circuit attempted to distinguish between tracking a
person’s movements outside the home and tracking who visits the
home.113 “[T]he cameras only highlighted Tuggle’s lack of movement,
surveying only the time he spent at home and thus not illuminating
what occurred when he moved from his home,” the court wrote. 114
107

Id. at 511 (emphasis added).
at 511–12.
109 Id.
110 Id. at 512 (emphasis added).
111 Id.
112 For example, a person running a bakery from their house may receive
shipments of ingredients such as flour, sugar, eggs, etc. from delivery persons which
could appear to be “large items.” Those persons would then leave the home with
payment that may look like a “small item.” Later, individuals may arrive at the home
to pick up and pay for baked goods. The baker may keep extra supplies or leftover
baked goods outside the home in a shed, so they have enough room in the kitchen to
bake the next batch.
113 Id. at 524.
114 Id. at 511 (emphasis original).
108Id.
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This distinction is not convincing because the pole camera recordings
provided a clear picture of Tuggle’s activity at his home for eighteen
months. That should be more than enough to put together an idea of
the intimacies of Tuggle’s life, a violation of society’s reasonable
expectations of privacy and therefore a violation of the Fourth
Amendment. As the South Dakota Supreme Court rightly stated, “the
fact that ‘the public does not get exposed to the aggregate of another’s
comings and goings’ was a factor that ought [to] be considered and
weighed” against finding a permissible search. 115
The use of warrantless camera surveillance should be limited.
Allowing eighteen months of nonstop observation does not comport
with the Supreme Court’s contemplation in Knotts. Other cases, too,
emphasize the short-term nature of warrantless pole camera use even
where courts eventually found an acceptable search without a warrant.
In United States v. Houston, the district court for the Eastern
District of Tennessee held that warrantless video surveillance beyond
fourteen days violated reasonable expectations of privacy. 116
Specifically, the court stated it did not have “information that the
agents attempted to limit the intrusiveness of the video surveillance,
other than limiting monitoring of the camera primarily to ‘daylight
hours.’”117 Even that minor limitation did not exist in Tuggle. Further,
“neither the testimony at the hearings nor [law enforcement’s]
affidavits state that the agents stopped monitoring the camera when
others besides the Defendant and his brother Rocky Houston were at
the property.”118 From this opinion, it is difficult to determine what
limitations on surveillance absent a warrant the court would prefer law
enforcement apply in order to hold that a search did not violate the
Fourth Amendment. The court found that warrantless surveillance of
115

Alayna Holmstrom, Big Brother Isn’t Watching: How State v. Jones
Transformed What One Can See with a Naked Eye into a Fourth Amendment Search,
63 S.D. L. REV. 450, 456 (2018) (quoting State v. Jones. 903 N.W.2d 101, ¶ 20
(2017)).
116 965 F.Supp. 2d 855, 871 (E.D. Tenn. 2013).
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the defendant’s curtilage for more than fourteen days was a violation
of the Fourth Amendment.119
Similarly in United States v. Anderson-Bagshaw, the court
“confess[ed] some misgivings about a rule that would allow the
government to conduct long-term video surveillance of a person’s
backyard without a warrant.”120 In that case, the court reviewed
twenty-four-day warrantless pole camera surveillance.121 The Sixth
Circuit addressed society’s expectation when it wrote that “[f]ew
people, it seems, would expect that the government can constantly film
their backyard for over three weeks using a secret camera that can pan
and zoom and stream a live image to government agents.”122 The
surveillance at issue in Tuggle was twenty-six times longer than the
three weeks the Sixth Circuit decided may be too far. The AndersonBagshaw court also distinguished Ciraolo by noting that case involved
only a brief flyover rather than prolonged surveillance,123 as the
Seventh Circuit should have done in Tuggle.
The Supreme Court, through the cases discussed in this section,
has emphasized the importance of protecting individuals from
advancing technology and prolong warrantless surveillance. By
permitting the type of surveillance at issue in Tuggle, the Seventh
Circuit chose to depart from the underlying principles of the Supreme
Court’s precedent and wrote an opinion contrary to Katz.
2. Precedent-Setting Concerns
In addition to the issues with the Seventh Circuit’s analysis, the
opinion fails to adequately address its harmful precedential value.
While the court state that its “confidence that the Fourth Amendment
(as currently understood by the courts) will adequately protect
individual privacy from government intrusion diminishes,” it did not
119
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seek to change tack with this case of first impression.124 The court
even went as far as to say, “[o]nce a technology is widespread, the
Constitution may no longer serve as a backstop preventing the
government from using that technology to access massive troves of
previously inaccessible private information because doing so will no
longer breach society’s newly minted expectations.” 125
Looking back at the Founding era, simply because British soldiers
intruded upon someone’s house did not mean that they should not have
expected privacy.126 Aggressive searches by British officials were
widespread.127 That did not change a person’s expectation that they
would have privacy at home. 128 In fact, it was these expectations of
privacy that birthed the Fourth Amendment. 129 Similarly, once public
telephone booths became popular, people did not suddenly expect that
their conversations would be recorded. 130 The Katz court decided that
individuals would not want their words broadcast to the public. 131
The issue of Fourth Amendment privacy has always developed
with technology to protect individuals. By changing course solely
because a certain technological tool is “widespread” opens up a much
broader scope of what the government can do to surveille people in the
United States without the judicial oversight that comes with a warrant.
Drones affixed with cameras are now widely available, 132 but it is
unlikely that most people would suggest they do not expect privacy
124
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from drone surveillance almost anywhere they go. Ring brand
doorbells which have cameras are rapidly becoming more common. 133
That does not mean that the average person expects for law
enforcement to have access to recording of them every time they walk
by a front door.
Each of these developments in technology do not mean that
society’s expectation of privacy dwindles as the devices become more
popular. It means that the courts—and legislatures—have to do more
to protect people from the government effecting searches that become
more intrusive with new technology. As Andrew Guthrie Ferguson,
law professor at American University told the Washington Post, “[i]f
the police demanded every citizen put a camera at their door and give
officers access to it, we might all recoil.”134 While that is not yet the
case, that reality is close. Ring’s terms of service states that users
consent to the company providing law enforcement with the doorbell’s
recordings “if the company thinks [it is] necessary to comply with
‘legal process or reasonable government request.’” 135 Further, the
cameras provide a view of neighboring homes across from the camera
and potentially down the street. 136 That should not mean that law
enforcement can access these videos without a warrant to conduct
lengthy surveillance.
Other technologies have come under fire—and been shut down in
some cases—for being too invasive on the public’s privacy. Facebook,
which has used facial recognition technology since 2010, is shutting
133
Jack Narcotta & Bill Ablondi, Strategy analytics: Amazon’s Ring Remained
atop the Video Doorbell Market in 2020, BUS. WIRE (May 12, 2021)
https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20210512005336/en/Strategy-AnalyticsAmazons-Ring-Remained-atop-the-Video-Doorbell-Market-in-2020 (detailing sales
statistics of video doorbells, “Amazon’s Ring sold more than 1.4 million video
doorbells in 2020”).
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forces, extending surveillance concerns, WASH. POST (Aug. 28, 2019).
https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2019/08/28/doorbell-camera-firmring-has-partnered-with-police-forces-extending-surveillance-reach/.
135 Id.
136 Id.

163

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 17

Fall 2021

down the tool due to increased concerns regarding personal privacy.137
In 2020, Facebook settled for $650 million after it “was accused of
illegally collecting biometric data” without users’ consent.138 With 2.8
billion users worldwide,139 Facebook’s technology would certainly be
considered widespread but the company shut it down because users
did not expect that their personal data to be tracked even by the
company itself. There’s no telling what law enforcement could do with
access to that type of data collection and information.
In Chicago, ShotSpotter technology has recently been the subject
of scrutiny and criticism. 140 This system works by attaching
microphones to structures in a neighborhood. 141 When the microphone
detects a loud bang, software analyzes the sound to classify it as a
gunshot or something else.142 Then, a human analyst reviews the
software’s decision by listening to the recording and studying the
waveform is produces.143 If the sound is determined to be a gunshot,
police are dispatched to the area. 144 In Chicago, the Inspector General
found that in only nine percent of alerts from ShotSpotter was there
any physical evidence at the scene that a gun had been fired. 145 As a
result, there have been calls to terminate Chicago’s multimillion dollar
137
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ShotSpotter technology, ABC7 CHI. (Nov. 12, 2021)
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contract with ShotSpotter.146 Critics point out that, in addition to
accuracy problems, the ShotSpotter microphones are discriminatory as
they are mostly put in predominately Black and brown
neighborhoods.147 Therefore, this technology results in increased
police presence in those neighborhoods, making privacy a privilege
that is assigned inequitably rather than enjoyed universally.
The Boston City Council, concerned about the public’s privacy,
recently passed a law which would require law enforcement to get
approval before using a new technology for surveillance.148 Further,
“if city authorities want to use existing surveillance technology in a
new way, they must receive council approval before deploying the
new use.”149 Technologies requiring approval include gunshot
detection devices, automatic license plate readers, biometric
surveillance, X-ray vans, etc.150
Clearly the use of new technology to surveille the public has
been an issue taken on by corporations, cities, and citizens. For the
Seventh Circuit to find that once a technology is widespread, the
expectation of privacy evaporates is against the public’s actual
response to widespread technological advances. These examples
illustrate the opposite, and the courts should be aware of public and
private responses to increased surveillance.
3. Practical Impact of Allowing Prolonged Surveillance
Today, it is truer than ever that seeing who arrives and departs
from a home reveals intimate details about one’s life. Simply by
watching the outside of someone’s house, you can learn how often a
person gets groceries and what they eat; it is possible to learn whether
146
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a person is on any prescription medication; it is possible to learn
whether a person is dating or in a relationship. With the advent of
services such as grocery and prescription delivery and online dating, a
person can choose to leave their house less frequently and have people
come to them.
These concerns are more important now than ever with the
COVID-19 pandemic and its associated lockdowns. On March 13,
2020, President Trump declared a national emergency, laying out a
forecast for the virus’s spread the same day. 151 In response, schools
and offices closed and events were canceled. 152 These office closures
required that workers remotely do their jobs. Researchers suggest that
this new era of remote work “may portend a significant shift in the
way a large segment of the workforce operates in the future.” 153 As of
December 2020, seventy-one percent of workers are doing their jobs
remotely.154 Approximately forty percent of adults say that their work
can be done from home even after the pandemic ends.155
In 2016, 11 million adults—eighteen percent—in the United
States were stay-at-home parents.156 Two million individuals in the
United States—six percent—are homebound, rarely or never leaving

151
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their house.157 This population includes those who receive Medicare,
many of whom are elderly.158 The reasons for being homebound
include living in a walk-up apartment, no longer driving, or lacking
mobility due to obesity.159 Researchers suggest that this population
with double within the next fifty years. 160 These people are especially
vulnerable because they “have high disease and symptom rates,
substantial functional limitations, and higher mortality than the nonhomebound.”161
Each of these groups—COVID-19 lockdown workers, remote
workers, stay-at-home parents, and the homebound—could be subject
to warrantless prolonged surveillance because of the Seventh Circuit’s
decision in Tuggle. That surveillance could potentially capture nearly
every activity that person may engage in because they are almost
always home. By doing so, it is possible to learn many intimate details
about that person’s life, which is impermissible without a warrant
under the Supreme Court’s rulings in Fourth Amendment cases.162
CONCLUSION
The use of camera surveillance without a warrant should be
limited. While a bright line rule that addresses how long is acceptable
will never be an appropriate way to handle prolonged surveillance,
eighteen months is certainly longer than what society would consider
reasonable. As technology develops, courts should be cognizant that
Fourth Amendment analysis develops with it. Rather than strictly
adhering to precedent regarding outdated technology, judges and
157
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justices should adapt their analysis in order not to sacrifice individual
rights as technology evolves.
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